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Abstract: This essay argues that 
ideals of cooperation or adversariality 
in argumentation are not equally 
attainable for women. Women in 
argumentation contexts face oppress-
sive limitations undermining argument 
success because their authority is un-
dermined by gendered norms of po-
liteness. Women endorsing or, alter-
natively, transgressing feminine norms 
of politeness typically defend their au-
thority in argumentation contexts. And 
yet, defending authority renders it less 
legitimate. My argument focuses on 
women in philosophy but bears the 
implication that other masculine dis-
course contexts present similar double 
binds that urge social and political 
change. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Resumé: On soutient que les idéaux 
de collaborateur ou d’adversaire dans 
l’argumentation ne sont pas également 
atteignables par les femmes. Dans des 
situations où a lieu l’argumentation, 
les femmes font face à des limitations 
opprimantes qui minent leur succès 
argumentatif parce que leur autorité 
est minée par des normes de politesses 
fondées sur les différents rôles atten-
dus des hommes et des femmes. 
L’acceptation ou la transgression de la 
politesse féminine est une raison pour 
répudier l’autorité des femmes dans 
un contexte d’argumentation, et toute 
tentative de protéger cette autorité la 
rend moins légitime. Mon argument 
concentre sur les femmes en philo-
sophie, mais implique que les femmes 
dans des contextes de discours mas-
culin font face à des défis contre 
l’autorité, et ceux-ci incitent une atten-
tion sociale et politique sur les straté-
gies d’une politesse fondée sur les 
rôles attendus des hommes et des 
femmes.  
 
Keywords: adversariality, argumentation, cooperation, discourse, gender, 
language, norms, oppression, politeness. 
 
1. Introduction 
It is not unusual for argumentation in the discipline of philosophy 
to be described in aggressive terms such as “verbal sparring,” 
“cutting to the point,” “thrusting the point home,” “going for the 
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jugular,” and “shooting down the opponent.”  These metaphors 
reveal an ideal of adversariality in argumentation that is starkly 
contrasted against an ideal of cooperation. An ideal of 
adversariality values competition and opposition in a win-lose 
argumentation context. An ideal of cooperation values agreement 
and mutual regard in an argumentation context promoting mutual 
gain. If we look more deeply at the discourse context of argu-
mentation we might see a parallel between gender and ideals of 
argumentation. The following discussion of gender supposes a long 
established distinction between ‘sex’ and ‘gender.’ The term ‘sex’ 
picks out those who fit a biological definition of persons as either 
male or female (or perhaps something in between); the term 
‘gender’ applies to those who are masculine or feminine, 
determined according to social roles that  describe persons as either 
men or women (and nothing in between).1 Gender is importantly 
revealed in language use. Masculine discourse is typically direct, 
forceful, and constructed through dominance strategies aiming to 
establish rank among interlocutors while feminine discourse is 
typically cooperative, aiming at securing agreement or connection 
(Mills 2003, Dolinina and Cecchetto 1998, Christie 2000, Scollon 
1995). In masculine discourse contexts that seem to favour 
aggression and adversariality, feminine discourse strategies are 
likely to result in “weak” or “apologetic” points that damage 
women’s argument success. Yet, transgressing feminine discourse 
norms through adopting masculine discourse strategies brings other 
costs to authority that can significantly undermine women’s 
argument success. So either endorsing or transgressing norms of 
feminine discourse can seriously diminish women’s possibility for 
argument success. In this essay I examine how women in 
philosophy, a discipline dominated by both the adversarial method 
and masculine discourse, are limited in their possibility for 
argument success because of oppressive discourse norms. I focus 
on politeness strategies because these best exemplify discourse 
norms reflecting gendered stereotypes affirming power and status 
for men but not women. The implication of my account is that 
women in argumentation contexts similar to philosophy face 
similar forms of oppression.  
                                                 
1 Two common suppositions flow from this distinction. The first is that gender is 
not attached to biology but is socially constructed in the sense that men are so-
cialized to conform to masculine traits while women are socialized in femininity. 
Second, the terms “men” and “women” are used interchangeably with “mascu-
line” and “feminine” to capture typical gender differences. I uphold these two 
suppositions even while I recognize that persons may transgress gendered roles 
through taking on characteristics of the other gender; that gender can be per-
formed many ways (with multiple femininities and masculinities); and that per-
sons may reject gender roles usually attached to their sex (males may be gen-
dered feminine and females may be gendered masculine).  
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Section 2 outlines the adversary method of argumentation to 
show that its paradigm of good reasoning disadvantages women 
while it advantages men. Ideals of adversarial argumentation have 
been previously criticized from a feminist point of view, but these 
critiques have missed an analysis of gendered discourse that 
exposes the oppressive double binds it presents to women in 
masculine discourse contexts. Section 3 considers the view that 
cooperative argumentation proves the better ideal to adversarial 
argumentation for women. But women seem no better situated to 
achieve an ideal of cooperation because feminine norms of 
cooperation in discourse demand deference and subordination, both 
of which undermine authority. Section 4 considers the possibility 
that women might transgress gendered norms of politeness by 
adopting masculine discourse strategies. In response, I show that 
doing so opens women to repercussions damaging to their 
authority. Section 5 concludes with the suggestion that women 
might adopt politeness selectivity as a means of navigating the 
oppressive double binds of gendered argumentation contexts. My 
account is significant for those who wish to gain insight from 
feminist theory to appreciate how ideals of argumentation value 
and promote certain forms of discourse over others, and to whose 
advantage. But improved theory is not the only or the most 
important aim of my account. Recognizing how gendered norms of 
politeness can be disadvantageous to women is an epistemically 
powerful tool for women who endorse feminine politeness and for 
those navigating masculine discourse contexts in transgressive 
ways; and for those women and men instigating change toward 
more inclusive environments, especially those affecting career 
success. If women are to advance in careers dominated by 
masculine discourse then I suggest that it is urgent to have both 
recognition of, and social and political challenges to, the use of 
politeness strategies in argumentation contexts. 
 
2. The adversary method and gendered discourse 
Janice Moulton (1983) points out that an ideal of aggression 
restricts and misrepresents the purpose and scope of argumentation. 
Aggression is valued in professions such as sales, management, 
law, philosophy, and politics, but only when it is attached to men. 
Men’s aggression is associated with positive qualities such as 
power, activity, ambition, authority, competence, and effectiveness. 
Moulton points out that women are not regarded as naturally 
aggressive and so their aggression is more readily noticed. And 
because women’s aggression is “unnatural” it is seen as unpleasant 
or undesirable (Moulton 1983, p. 150). Moulton’s discussion of 
aggression and masculine qualities has gained much attention from 
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feminist philosophers, who continue to point out that philosophy is 
dominated by masculine ideals and values subsumed under the 
guise of objectivity.2 Philosophy has traditionally upheld a 
paradigm of good reasoning revealed in what Moulton calls the 
adversary method. The adversary method governs evaluation of 
philosophical claims. Moulton points out that reasoning used to 
discover claims or relate claims to other beliefs and systems of 
ideas is only philosophical reasoning if it is deductive. Deductive 
reasoning supposes a debate between adversaries trying to defend 
their views against fatal counterexamples provided by real or 
imagined opponents. So the best way of evaluating claims 
objectively in philosophy is to subject those claims to the strongest 
or most extreme opposition. Hence, good reasoning in philosophy 
is adversarial (p. 153). Nonadversarial reasoning is regarded as 
weak and ineffective while non-deductive reasoning is not thought 
reasoning at all. Thus the adversary method, as an ideal of good 
reasoning, greatly narrows the scope of philosophical 
argumentation. It also excludes many sources of possible 
philosophical progress. It dismisses as plausible those forms of 
reasoning that aim at solving problems for oneself; convincing the 
indifferent or uncommitted; working out nascent ideas; or simply 
discussing issues with like-minded thinkers (p. 157). These forms 
of reasoning are significant alternatives to reasoning that aims at 
objectivity. Moulton suggests that a cooperative, friendly, and 
nonadversarial manner may garner success in many argumentation 
contexts. If reasoning aims at cooperation then it admits many 
other sources of knowledge or epistemic progress than that which 
philosophy’s adversary method permits.  
In the next section I discuss an ideal of cooperative 
argumentation as an alternative to traditional philosophical 
reasoning. My purpose is not to present a case for cooperative 
reasoning as epistemically or pedagogically better than adversarial 
reasoning, although I would not disagree with either claim. My 
concern is to show that an ideal of cooperative argumentation 
proves no better an alternative to adversarial argumentation in the 
case of women, who must either embrace or transgress feminine 
norms of discourse. While Moulton recognizes that aggression is 
positively valued in men but devalued in women, she does not aim 
to develop a gendered account of argumentation or gendered 
discourse. She does acknowledge gendered discourse but fails to 
recognize its significance. Moulton cites Lakoff’s (1975) view that 
aggressive speech, as more powerful and effective language, is 
socially encouraged in men but forbidden for women, whose 
speech is expected to be passive and polite (p. 150). Moulton 
                                                 
2 For more recent discussions see for example Sally Haslanger (2008), Regan 
Penaluna (2009), Rae Langton (2000) or Candace Vogler (1995. 
Politeness in Gendered Argumentation Contexts 
 
239 
dismisses Lakoff’s view of gendered discourse as irrelevant to her 
critique of the adversary paradigm because Lakoff conflates 
aggression with positive qualities and so “[Lakoff] does not see 
that polite, nonabrupt speech, full of hesitations and qualifiers can 
be a sign of great power and very effective in giving the impression 
of great thought and deliberation, or in getting one’s listeners on 
one’s side” (p. 150). I have three responses to this claim, each of 
which will be developed through the course of this paper. First, 
politeness is not simply a matter of hesitations and qualifiers in 
women’s speech (although it certainly includes these); second, 
while politeness may signal power, great thought, and great 
deliberation, it does not seem to do so for women; and third, the 
politeness typical of women is not a sign of power but of deference 
and subordination.  
On my account, the adversary method disadvantages women 
because women cannot engage in aggressive modes associated with 
competence, power, authority, and so forth without encountering 
double binds or harmful stereotypes. Marilyn Frye (1983) first 
argued the now well-established feminist point that double binds 
are oppressive, placing constraints on members of groups with no 
hope of escape, disadvantaging through restricting members’ 
opportunities. Within philosophical argumentation contexts, wo-
men face a serious double bind. Women cannot be seen as good 
philosophers without endorsing the aggressive adversary method, 
but doing so entails that women are subject to negative character 
ascriptions. Women’s supposed aggression is typically described in 
hostile terms ascribing negative character traits (bitchiness, catti-
ness, rudeness, coldness, uppitiness, and so on). Women who do 
not embrace the adversary method fit gendered expectations of 
what it means to be “nice” or “good” women but that comes at the 
cost of failing to be regarded as good philosophers. Outside of 
philosophical argumentation contexts, double binds continue to 
disadvantage women. Women who are competent arguers are 
subject to negative character ascriptions associated with their 
apparent aggression, but to avoid such ascriptions women must risk 
appearing to be incompetent arguers. In what follows I expand on 
these points to draw out the impact of the disadvantages these and 
other double binds present for women in male-dominated 
argumentation contexts.  
To avoid possible misunderstandings of my claims concerning 
gender, allow me to present some key theoretical underpinnings of 
my account.3 First, my account does not suppose a view of one’s 
                                                 
3 I appeal to empirical research in support of my claims about gendered dis-
course, recognizing that this research often fails to capture the full spectrum of 
difference (across class or race, for instance) and represents a global North view 
of masculine and feminine discourse. For further discussion of how culture is 
integral to understanding the construction of gendered discourse and examples of 
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supposed “nature.” The essentialist claim holds that all women or 
all men share a “nature” or “essence.” Phyllis Rooney (2003, 1991) 
is critical of essentialist views of “masculine” and “feminine” that 
inform accounts of argumentation contexts.4 These views rely as 
much on gender stereotypes as they do empirical evidence. Rooney 
points out that stereotypes of femininity assume women are less 
rational than men, or have a different sort of rationality attached to 
their “nature.” So, for instance, that which is masculine is by its 
very nature linear, abstract, dispassionate, and antagonistic while 
that which is feminine is by its nature contextual, emotional, 
narrative, and cooperative. These stereotypes are reproduced in 
metaphors of reason, casting that which is rational as sharply 
distinct from the irrational, creating a great divide between reason 
on the one side, along with understanding, the will, rational beliefs, 
and so forth; and unreason on the other side, along with feelings, 
impulses, imaginings, dreams, and intuition (Rooney 1991). Meta-
phors of reason embedding gendered stereotypes may mistakenly 
inform empirical “descriptions” or “findings”—such as those 
describing women as irrational. This view, common throughout the 
history of philosophy, was used to justify misogynistic philo-
sophical accounts excluding women from philosophical discourse 
under the guis8e of neutral theorizing (Rooney 1991, p. 94). 
Rooney’s point about essentializing discourse reflects the 
feminist concern that accounts of “femininity” that are tied to 
claims about “woman’s nature” are fundamentally misleading.5 At 
the same time, we should recognize the feminist claim that it is 
impossible to discover any empirical truths about what is “mas-
culine” or “feminine” that are not informed by gender stereotypes. 
Stereotypes of femininity are exactly the problem that the feminist 
is aiming to address because these stereotypes disadvantage women 
(not their “nature”). Sally Haslanger (2008) shows that gendered 
stereotypes shape our understanding of empirical evidence because 
they colour perceptual schemas. Schemas inform perception and 
interpretation of information, supplying explanations where data 
are missing or ambiguous. Viewing argumentation as rational and 
associating it with masculinity in terms of its aims (target, attack, 
                                                                                                              
different cultures, see Gϋnthner (1996); and for general overviews of difference 
in language relevant to culture see Wierzbicka (2003), Watts, Ide and Ehlich 
(2005), or Hickey and Stewart (2005). 
4 Thanks to Phyllis Rooney for prompting me to consider and clarify my views 
on essentialism and gender stereotypes. 
5 Trina Grillo (1995) offers an excellent summary of the difficulties feminists 
have faced with the notion of essentialism. Notably, she points out that essential-
ist views of “women” or “women’s nature” suppose characteristics of white, 
middle-class women; cannot encompass the experience of oppression of women 
of different races, class, age, sexuality, and so forth; and present the false view 
that a single concept of “women” can be extracted from differences between 
women occupying many different groups. 
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and demolish an opponent) and its ideals (penetrating, seminal, and 
rigorous) contrasts the masculine against the feminine. Haslanger 
draws on familiar views of reason/emotion, objective/subjective, 
and mind/body as gendered dichotomies, which she argues reveal 
schemas that value the masculine over the feminine. Schemas 
assuming masculine ideals of reasoning and argumentation 
implicitly exclude women and they do so without supposing that it 
is natural, or somehow essential to women’s “nature,” that women 
fail to meet masculinist standards of reasoning. In philosophy, 
gendered schemas of argumentation appear to contribute to bias in 
judging women’s philosophical work and hence lead to bias in 
publication, grant, promotion, and tenure decisions (Haslanger 
2008, pp. 213-214).  
Gendered views of reasoning and argumentation can succeed 
without supposing essentialism if we recognize that gender is a 
constructed concept. Feminists have long recognized that gender is 
achieved through acting in ways that conform to socially prescribed 
gender roles.6 Gender is formed through social interaction and is 
revealed in language and behaviour. So it is quite possible for those 
sexed male or female to be gendered either as masculine or 
feminine.7 Commonly, persons expect that those gendered femi-
nine, or women, are females and those gendered masculine, or 
men, are males. That expectation is implicit in gendered perceptual 
schemas and in essentializing discourse that suppose feminine 
qualities are tied to female biology. Such gendered stereotypes 
inform our understanding of gender. Gender is revealed in social 
roles, not biology. Haslanger describes the social role of gender as 
a pattern of social relations that situates men as the dominant social 
class. Norms, values, and identities are gendered in relation to 
those power relations that constitute gender (Haslanger 2000, p. 
37). There seems to be little empirical under-standing we can turn 
                                                 
6 We can say gender is causally constructed because successfully being a woman 
is due to adopting feminine traits and expressing feminine behaviour, each of 
which are learned from childhood through to adulthood (Haslanger 1995). A 
strict dichotomy holds in the social construction of gender: one is either gen-
dered masculine or gendered feminine. Since socially laid out roles of femininity 
and masculinity are dichotomous, they resist any blurring of the lines between 
what is feminine and what is masculine and they resist any blending of feminine 
and masculine traits. Blending and blurring are possible, thus they prove essen-
tialism false. At the same time, blending and blurring do not prove social con-
structionism false: they just instance ways individuals may defy socially con-
structed roles. 
7 I use the terms ‘males’ and ‘females’ to indicate a person’s sex, but I do not 
mean to exclude other possible sexes. Anne Fausto-Sterling (1993) presents a 
compelling case for the existence of five sexes. Biological classification might 
admit as many sexes, but this point has not affected (and I expect is unlikely to 
affect) the social classification of gender into two sorts, either masculine or 
feminine. 
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to in generating an understanding of gender, if the very norms and 
values underlying gender rely on stereotypes. This point does not 
prevent us from recognizing that the adversary method excludes 
women from accepted standards of reasoning and argumentation. 
Rather, it is essential to understanding that society identifies 
discourse as masculine or feminine according to implicit social 
norms and values. 
Second, my argument does not claim that all women are 
determined to be disadvantaged in argumentation contexts. Rather, 
it is a general claim concerning those employing feminine 
discourse in masculine argumentation contexts. I recognize that 
women might circumvent disadvantage in transgressive ways. For 
instance, those gendered feminine might positively embrace 
adversarial argumentation contexts. Louise Antony (2003) recog-
nizes that many women find masculine modes of reasoning and 
argumentation confrontational and alienating. Those who prevail 
are often the ones willing to shout the loudest, talk the longest, and 
yet keep all discussion of emotion and feelings excluded from 
argumentation contexts—and those who prevail are generally men. 
Many women in these contexts find the relentless abstraction 
pointless and exhausting, removed from issues of serious 
importance (p. 127). Antony points out that women need not have 
these sorts of responses. Women can transgress gender norms and 
positively revel in the freedom to argue at will without having to 
conform to feminine norms of being “nice” (cooperative, defer-
ential, and pleasing) or otherwise agreeable. Antony’s own feminist 
reflections on transgressing gender norms show that her acquisition 
of the tools of philosophical analysis has been a profoundly 
empowering experience for her and for many of her female 
students. Through embracing philosophical reasoning and argu-
mentation Antony willingly breaches gender norms of femininity 
by “valuing my own capacity for reason” (p. 128). Since my 
account bears implications for women in masculine discourse 
contexts outside of philosophy, it also recognizes that women may 
overturn stereotypes of femininity outside of philosophical 
reasoning contexts. But transgressing feminine norms is not always 
met with success. In Section 4 I identify significant limits to trans-
gressing norms of gendered discourse and serious effects of 
transgression for women in argumentation contexts. But first, I turn 
below to consider the view that feminine discourse might uphold a 
preferable ideal of cooperation in argumentation. 
 
3. Politeness, rationality, and reasonableness 
Moulton suggests that, as an alternative to the adversary method, 
philosophy might take its cue from other professions in which a 
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“friendly, warm, nonadversarial manner surely does not interfere 
with persuading customers to buy, getting employees to carry out 
directions conscientiously, convincing juries, teaching students, 
getting help and cooperation from coworkers, and promotions from 
the boss” (Moulton 1983, p. 151). The idea that argumentation can 
succeed through nonadversarial techniques has since been devel-
oped outside of philosophy as cooperative argumentation. These 
accounts often reject persuasion as an aim of argumentation be-
cause persuasion implicitly values competition and hence, values 
combative argumentation.8 In contrast, cooperative argumentation 
aims at generating mutual respect, consensus, or community build-
ing (e.g. Mansbridge 1983, Makau and Mary 2001, Gilbert 1997). 
Feminist critiques of the adversarial method that reject persuasion 
consider mutually satisfactory solutions the aim of argument, 
achieved through practices such as consensus formation, coalescent 
reasoning, and non-dualistic thinking (for an overview, see Pal-
czewski 1996). But not all models of cooperative argumentation 
reject persuasion. Christopher Tindale (1999) provides a fully de-
veloped theory that both recognizes persuasion as part of argumen-
tation and upholds agreement as the main aim of cooperative ar-
gumentation. I take up Tindale’s account because I am concerned 
about his central claim that cooperative argumentation is not only 
reasonable, but rational. I argue against this justification on the 
grounds that an ideal of cooperation bears serious implications for 
women as arguers. I show that stereotypical norms of feminine po-
liteness reflect women’s cooperation at the cost of subordination 
and deference. My aim is not to argue against cooperation but to 
show that cooperation may prove neither reasonable nor rational 
for women in communication contexts. If I am correct then a more 
complex, gendered analysis is needed to justify cooperation as an 
ideal of argumentation.  
On Tindale’s view, argumentation encompasses everyday 
contexts in which reasons are given and assessed, beliefs are 
recognized and justified, and personal development is encouraged. 
Argumentation is not concerned primarily with its internal 
structure, such as a correct application of rules aiming at producing 
truth, because arguers are first and foremost communicators and 
not logicians. Persons construct arguments on the basis of what a 
real or imagined audience would agree with and the aim is to 
produce an argument eliciting agreement for its thesis (p. 119). 
Cooperative argumentation is judged successful according to how 
well it impacts the audience. If the audience adheres to its thesis, 
then the argument is strong; if not, the argument is weak (p. 85). 
Not anything goes in assessing the impact of argument because a 
                                                 
8 For an overview of these and similar challenges to the model of argumentation 
as persuasion see Williams and McGee (2000). 
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reasonable argument will not aim to convince its audience at any 
cost. Tindale draws out several ways in which an argument may be 
reasonable, but for our purposes it is enough to draw out the 
following two claims. Argumentation must be directed toward, and 
in a way relevant to, a particular audience. Relevance includes both 
that arguers intend the premises to be relevant to the conclusion 
and that they aim to relate new ideas to their audience’s commonly 
held assumptions (pp. 108-111). In a later work, Tindale (2006, p. 
460) expands his view to say that cooperative argumentation is also 
rational. In this work he broadens his view of agreement to include 
forming joint understanding, reaching new perspectives, exploring 
issues, developing inquiries, persuading, and resolving disputes.  
If cooperation is reasonable and rational, then politeness might 
seem reasonable and rational. Mark Kingwell (1993) presents a 
philosophical account of politeness as a communicative strategy 
aiming at cooperation. Kingwell’s account of politeness relies on 
an understanding of cooperation as a rational pursuit. Drawing on 
Geoffrey Leech (1983) and Bruce Fraser (1990), Kingwell argues 
that politeness is not a deviation from rational dialogue but a 
central aspect of it because it mutually furthers interlocutors’ own 
ends. To make his case, Kingwell appeals to Penelope Brown and 
Stephen Levinson’s (1987) pioneering sociolinguistic theory on 
politeness. The authors pursue Grice’s “principle of cooperation” to 
argue that politeness furthers rational and efficient speech between 
interlocutors, describing this dynamic in terms of “face.” Brown 
(1980) explains two ways politeness preserves face. Negative face 
satisfies our desire not to be imposed upon. We can recognize that 
what we will say might be unwelcome or an imposition and use 
negative politeness, such as apologies (“I’m sorry, might I ask you 
for a pen?”) or other forms of address that make it easy for the 
addressee to reject requests. Politeness strategies preserving 
positive face recognize our desires to be liked, admired, or other-
wise receive positive responses. Clear cases of positive politeness 
include expressions of interest (“What magnificent roses you have, 
Jenny. Where did you get them?”) and expressions of approval 
(“What a fantastic idea, Henrietta!”). Politeness upholding positive 
face aims to disarm possible threats and treat the addressee as a 
fellow member (of an in-group), a friend, or a person who is valued 
and liked (Brown 1980, pp. 114-115). 
The main concern driving adherence to politeness strategies on 
the sociolinguistic view is that of losing face and consequent social 
discord. Face-saving strategies aim at satisfying desires of approval 
and cooperation while face-threatening strategies are destructive, 
generating discomfort, humiliation, or anger (Scollon and Scollon 
1995). A lack of politeness exposes communicators to face threat-
ening discourse. Impoliteness makes demands on others, issues 
commands, or otherwise intrudes upon others’ freedom of action 
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(Mills, 2003, p. 6). Face threatening dialogue is thus subject to 
negative responses, such as the retaliatory attitude “if you don’t 
maintain my face… I’m not going to maintain yours” (Christie 
2000, p. 154). Such lack of cooperation is assessed as a loss of 
rationality on Kingwell’s view.9 I suggest that polite discourse may 
further cooperation, but it often comes with significant costs to 
women. Thus it may be neither reasonable nor rational for women 
to engage in polite discourse in the pursuit of cooperation. My 
account relies on the point that discourse, and hence politeness, is 
gendered. One might think that discourse is gendered because men 
and women reason differently, and this difference is revealed in 
politeness strategies. That approach is evident in several prominent 
critiques of the adversary method moving beyond Moulton’s initial 
analysis of philosophical argumentation, which I turn to now.  
Maryann Ayim (1991) argues that metaphors of dominance, 
control, and violence are implicit to masculine argumentation 
contexts. Following Spender (1980) and Smith (1985), Ayim 
asserts that men are less polite than women. On the basis of this 
point, she argues that men’s and women’s discourse styles are very 
different: men aim at mastery through dominance in argument 
while women aim at affiliation and agreement. Catherine 
Palcezewski (1996) connects Ayim’s view to those following Carol 
Gilligan (1982) who argue that men and women use different 
reasoning. Gilligan argued that men adopt a justice perspective in 
moral reasoning using objective, impartial language of rights and 
justice, while women reason in the care perspective, driven by a 
consideration of the relations and emotions of particular others. 
Several earlier articles in Informal Logic relate this view to 
argumentation theory. Palcezewski (1996) shows that Deborah Orr 
(1989), Michael Gilbert (1994), and Karen Warren (1988) each 
uphold Gilligan’s view that men and women reason differently to 
explain gender difference in argumentation contexts. Given these 
sorts of approaches, we might think that women’s reasoning is 
more suited to achieve the ideal of cooperation than men’s 
discourse strategies because the former, unlike the latter, aim 
toward affiliation and agreement. In a special issue of 
Argumentation and Advocacy, responses to such challenges of the 
adversary method warn against privileging male norms (Crenshaw 
1996), reproducing misleading gender stereotypes of “feminine 
style” argumentation (Bruner 1996), and caution against removing 
adversariality from argumentation altogether (Fulkerson 1996). 
These responses share worries concerning the dichotomous 
                                                 
9 My discussion of politeness and impoliteness might seem to deny that there can 
be degrees of politeness, as one reviewer of this journal pointed out. I do not 
reject the view that politeness might come in degrees, but it is not essential to 
this paper to develop that account. 
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classification of “men’s reasoning” and “women’s reasoning” that I 
think we should take seriously.  
But it is not my aim to enter the debate of whether men and 
women approach argumentation differently because of any 
difference in their reasoning styles. Neither do I suppose (in my 
argument here) that women are more polite than men or that 
women should endorse cooperative argumentation. My plan is not 
to simply describe gendered difference in argumentation or to 
prescribe a gendered approach to argument. Rather, I argue that 
argumentation contexts are in many ways oppressive to women and 
make the metaphilosophical point that ideals of argumentation 
further that oppression. Ideals carry moral and epistemological 
weight, since they are both considered valuable or good and guide 
thinking and response. If ideals of argumentation further women’s 
oppression then we need to promote standards of good 
argumentation that are more inclusive. My aim is not to work out 
that theory but to do the initial work of elucidating how gendered 
norms and stereotypes restrict women’s opportunities to meet 
ideals of argumentation and to indicate some practical responses.  
My aim in this section is to show that an ideal of cooperation 
disadvantages women in argumentation contexts. I first consider 
what might seem to be an obvious view, that cooperation 
advantages women in argumentation contexts. It might seem 
obvious to those who appreciate that typically feminine discourse 
strategies aim at cooperation and who also advocate an ideal of 
cooperative argumentation. I argue against this approach because 
what counts as cooperative discourse differs according to gendered 
stereotypes of politeness in ways that affirm power and status for 
men, but not women. My approach considers discourse gendered 
because men and women are socialized in different forms of 
communication, evident in social norms and values implicit to 
gendered politeness. I draw out the gendered difference in 
politeness strategies below, drawing on current sociolinguistic 
research. Brown and Levinson’s ground-breaking work on 
politeness, and hence Kingwell’s account based on it, fails to 
capture the significance of how cooperation is achieved through 
politeness strategies. Recognizing how politeness is gendered is 
essential to understanding how contexts of argumentation and 
persuasion incorporate power and status differences.  
In the decades since Brown and Levinson’s theory, 
sociolinguists have recognized that politeness is situated within 
gendered communication contexts that are significantly different. 
Typical masculine discourse strategies aim to unambiguously 
establish either equality or superiority-subordination ranking and to 
maintain that ranking throughout the communication period 
(Dolinina and Ceccehtto 1998). Relatedly, men’s politeness 
strategies favour status, independence, competition, and so forth 
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(Scollon and Scollon, p. 239). These strategies establish dominance 
in conversation through encouraging competition between 
individuals to establish rank. While some might think that such 
competition is face-threatening and hence, impolite, the reverse 
holds. Jennifer Coates (2004) shows that masculine politeness 
establishes connection between conversational group members 
through shared competitive and adversarial activities that aim to 
establish rank (through silences, monologues, interrupting, direct 
disagreement, and so on). Men can take turns insulting and 
swearing at each other and evidence verbal sparring that is friendly, 
not quarrelsome. Such forms of masculine discourse emphasize a 
regard for the individual’s autonomy, needs, and interests but not at 
the cost of group solidarity because connection is furthered through 
such competition and conflict (p. 138).  
In contrast, typical feminine speech is cooperative in a way 
attentive to the needs of others (Christie 2000). Feminine politeness 
strategies aim at cooperation through connection and involvement, 
reflecting values of intimacy, connection, inclusion, and problem 
sharing (Scollon and Scollon, p. 240). These values are reflected in 
positive politeness strategies such as paying attention to others, 
showing a strong interest in their affairs, using first names, and 
establishing in-group membership. Notice that these above forms 
of politeness defer one’s own interests for the sake of focusing on 
those of others to secure cooperation and connection. Connection 
and cooperation are central to fostering close, meaningful 
relationships. Feminine politeness strategies aim at connection 
through extending conversation, particularly within private 
conversational settings (Crawford, p. 42). Communication strate-
gies promoting dialogue include diminutives and euphemisms 
(tiny, itsy-bitsy, little), ‘empty’ adjectives (charming, sweet, ador-
able), hedging assertions (sort of, kind of, I guess), questioning 
intonation in declarative contexts, indirect speech or passive voice, 
and tag questions (Do you know what I mean? Right? Do you see?) 
(Lakoff 2000). Such politeness strategies inherently indicate lower 
social ranking, putting others’ interests first or demoting one’s own 
position (Cameron and Coates, 1989). Women’s politeness is 
inclined towards deference and thus, towards subordination.10 
The above account of gender difference reflects gender 
stereotypes favouring masculine domination and feminine 
subordination. Feminist theorists have long recognized that norms 
and practices stereotype femininity in ways valuing deference, 
passiveness, and subservience while masculine stereotypes value 
aggression, competition, and dominance. We must be cautious 
                                                 
10 I give an overview of gendered politeness strategies to show how they further 
women’s deference and subordination elsewhere (Burrow 2008). 
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about embedded assumptions in such stereotypes of femininity.11 In 
the case of politeness, stereotypes of femininity reflect a white, 
middle-class paradigm of politeness linked to self-effacement, 
weakness, vulnerability, and friendliness Sara Mills (2003). This 
characterization of femininity assumes women’s powerlessness and 
conflict avoidance and is implicit to the view that feminine 
politeness aims at cooperation through deference and subor-
dination. But theories of feminine politeness generally fail to 
recognize their bias towards white, middle-class stereotypes.12 
Mills argues that feminists have challenged such stereotypes and 
have had success in doing so; therefore, politeness theorists should 
no longer assume that “everyone has the same ‘take’ on a 
stereotype, or that they share assumptions with others about what a 
particular stereotype consists of, or even that they accept 
stereotypes at face value rather than, for example, ridiculing them” 
(pp. 203-204; italics are mine). I urge that feminists should 
challenge feminine stereotypes and aim to break those moulds that 
constrain women’s possibility for action (and have argued 
elsewhere (Burrow 2009) for some practical ways women might do 
so). But I reject Mills’s view that politeness theorists should reject 
or even ridicule gender stereotypes. Theorists who do so miss 
recognizing the significant ways in which stereotypes socially 
construct gendered norms and practices of politeness. 
Earlier I showed that gender is socially constructed rather than 
an essential feature of persons. Gender stereotypes  inform social 
understandings of gender, including gendered discourse. Those 
stereotypes carry with them implicit norms and values that are built 
into our very understanding of gender. The above view of feminine 
politeness captures a stereotypical view of femininity reflecting the 
norms and values of those who are white and middle-classed. It is 
problematic to base normative considerations of what is morally 
right, good, or just on the basis of such stereotypes. But it seems 
perfectly appropriate to offer a descriptive account acknowledging 
that those same stereotypes inform gender practices. The social 
reality the dominant theories describe above is that what counts as 
politeness for women is stereotypically feminine. The interesting 
work to do in sociolinguistic theory is to show how stereotypes of 
                                                 
11 Feminists have moved beyond analyses of class and race to argue that ideals of 
femininity additionally assume Western norms and practices of those young, 
heterosexual, and able-bodied. Feminist philosophers have responded to earlier 
feminist theories supposing just those ideals, arguing that a feminist theory must 
take into account many different femininities and not simply the dominant 
Western view. For an overview, see Mikkola (2008). 
12 And these are the dominant theories—which is no surprise since, as Gϋnthner 
points out, most theories addressing gendered speaking practices focus on 
Western European and white middle-class communities in the United States 
(Gunthner 1996, p. 450).  
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femininity differ across culture and how those stereotypes inform 
what counts as feminine politeness, relative to the culture. Susanne 
Gϋnthner (1996) has made some progress in this area but she 
acknowledges that much more work is needed to avoid 
perpetuating a white, middle-class, Western perspective within 
politeness theory.13  
An ideal of cooperative argumentation might seem to favour 
typically feminine politeness strategies, since these strategies aim 
at cooperation achieved through connection and attention to 
particular others. We have seen that feminine politeness aims at 
cooperation (which Kingwell argues is rational) and that Tindale 
considers cooperative argumentation not just rational, but also 
reasonable. But I showed above that feminine politeness strategies 
are deferential and subordinating. Thus it seems neither reasonable 
nor rational for women to further cooperation in argumentation 
contexts—cooperation furthers their own subordination. Neither 
Kingwell nor Tindale provides resources for addressing this 
concern because each overlooks discourse as gendered. In the next 
section I consider how women might negotiate gendered norms and 
practices of politeness through transgressive discourse. Women 
might adopt masculine discourse or adversarial argumentation 
instead of aiming at cooperation through stereotypically feminine 
discourse. Transgressing gender norms brings with it women’s 
possibility of gaining authority and power in argumentation 
contexts. While authority and power can be achieved through such 
methods, I argue that they are limited in their success. I show that 
for women, negotiating gendered norms of discourse in 
argumentation contexts is complex and restricted by double binds. 
Before continuing, it is worth considering the point that 
women’s dialogue may simply indicate social position more than 
gender. If this is correct, then my gendered analysis may seem 
misguided. But I doubt it is. The idea that women’s discourse is 
best described as powerless discourse was first presented by O’Barr 
and Atkins (1980). The authors based their claim on their analysis 
of over 150 hours of transcripts by female witnesses in the courts. 
Their findings showed that many female witnesses used cooper-
ative politeness strategies that Lakoff (1975) first identified as 
women’s language, characterized by the use of hedges, dimin-
utives, tag questions, passive voice, and the like. O’Barr and Atkins 
found that women scored higher in their use of such language and 
men scored lower, noting that some women do not use women’s 
language while some men do. So, they suggested that the linguistic 
features typically associated with women’s politeness is best 
                                                 
13 To the extent that this paper discusses dominant research in politeness theory it 
assumes white, Western, middle-class stereotypes of femininity in its view of 
how politeness is subordinating to women.  
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described as powerless language. Jennifer Coates (2004) points out 
that O’Barr and Atkin’s view has since been disproven by Candace 
West (1998) and Nicola Woods (1989), whose research controls for 
gender and status variables. Both West and Woods show that 
gender and not power explains why feminine politeness is 
deferential rather than dominating. Their research shows that 
women in social positions of power evidence more deferential 
dialogue than men and experience negative politeness strategies 
such as being interrupted or otherwise dominated in conversation 
(Coates 2004, pp. 109-110). While I admit that women are typi-
cally rendered less powerful than men, that does not entail the 
dichotomy that the above researchers suppose, namely that women 
are less powerful either because of their position in society or 
because of their gender. The two are so intertwined that a causal 
relationship may never be clearly identifiable or even useful. We 
can still acknowledge women’s continued social powerlessness in 
the use of the term “feminine politeness” if we recognize the 
common feminist point that what is gendered feminine in society is 
typically devalued and rendered less powerful.14  
 
4. Authority   
If feminine politeness furthers cooperative argumentation through 
deference and subordination, perhaps transgressing gendered 
norms of politeness is a better route to increasing power and status 
in argumentation contexts. Like many of my women colleagues in 
philosophy, I have engaged in this method myself. But I think it 
offers limited hope for escaping double binds implicit to gendered 
discourse and hence, argumentation. We saw earlier that ideals of 
adversarial argumentation favour masculine norms and values in 
ways that implicitly exclude women. Haslanger (2008) argues that 
philosophy’s adversarial method excludes women and thus 
represents an implicit sexism that undermines women’s academic 
success. Philosophy continues to be dominated by men and 
masculine discourse.15 So it is not surprising that women in 
                                                 
14 We can also recognize that what applies to women may also apply, in different 
ways, to other forms of “low” social status. Thanks to Cate Hundleby for point-
ing this out. 
15 Haslanger’s (2008) article reveals the hostile nature of philosophy and the 
chilly climate women experience in it. The view in traditional philosophy is that 
a successful philosopher should look and act like a (traditional, white) man 
(p.212). Sexism in philosophy is not as blatant as it once was; yet it is still appar-
ent. It is well known that women in philosophy on average occupy 20% of all 
tenure-track positions. Women in bachelor’s programs in philosophy in 2006-7 
earned 31% of degrees in the United States, compared to 60% in biology and 
45% in mathematics for example (Penaluna 2009). Women in philosophy re-
ceived 12% of PhDs awarded in 1969-1970, increasing to 27% thirty years later; 
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philosophy continually struggle to secure power and authority. I 
suggest that women face similar struggles in other argumentation 
contexts dominated by masculine discourse (which implicitly 
reflect masculine norms and values as revealed in gendered 
stereotypes). One might argue that masculine discourse dominates 
most professions since men tend to dominate positions of power 
and status. The commonly recognized effect of the glass ceiling 
shows that women secure limited advancement in most professions. 
Women have been active in the public sphere in many societies for 
decades and yet the majority of women worldwide remain in lower 
and middle ranks in their professions while men dominate top-tier 
positions; women are prevented from achieving upward job 
mobility by the glass ceiling (see Estrich 2001, Kellerman and 
Rhode 2007, Fineman and Dougherty 2005). How might women 
gain power and authority as arguers in philosophy and similar 
argumentation contexts dominated by masculine discourse? Below 
I examine whether women might transgress feminine politeness 
through adopting masculine discourse or the adversarial method in 
argumentation contexts.  
 One way to transgress gendered discourse is to transgress 
gender norms altogether. Judith “Jack” Halberstam (1998) has 
coined the phrase “female masculinity” (a term commonly recog-
nized in gender theory) to show how females might transgress 
femininity. Female masculinity is possible since gender is a social 
construct and not an essential trait attached to biology. Halber-
stam’s view is that individuals can transgress social norms and 
practices attached to gender as a “healthful alternative to what are 
considered the histrionics of conventional femininities” (p. 9). She 
illustrates her view of female masculinity by appealing to narra-
tives and examples of females with masculine traits. “Masculinity” 
as she describes it represents power and promise of social privilege. 
Halberstam argues that it is best to understand how power and 
status exemplify masculinity in contexts other than the usual 
method of zeroing in on the white, middle-class, male body (p. 2). 
To illustrate, she provides the example of the James Bond film, 
Goldeneye. Bond seems an exemplar of male masculinity, suave 
suits and debonair charm included. His charm never ceases to have 
misogynistic overtones and, even though his sexual innuendos of-
ten fail him, he can always rely on his technological gadgets. His 
boss is M, an older woman, who evidences female masculinity in 
chastising Bond, putting him in his place and telling him what 
really needs to be done to save the mission. Halberstam argues that 
                                                                                                              
over the past ten years the numbers remain the same, with 25%-30% of women 
receiving PhDs in philosophy (Crasnow 2009). The proportion of women in phi-
losophy remains much lower than other disciplines, which on average see 41% 
of doctorates awarded to women (Crasnow, 2009).  
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in having that role, M wields a power that reveals Bond’s mascu-
linity to be an ineffective sham (p. 4). Perhaps M also performs 
masculinity in wielding power over Bond as a superior in the 
workplace (an unconventional workplace though it may be). In 
workplaces dominated by men, the understanding of what it is to be 
a worker conforms to ideals of masculinity (Martin 2003, p. 357).  
Women can also perform masculinity not by wholeheartedly 
adopting masculinity but by adopting masculine discourse, doing 
so to earn professional status and approval. Mills (2003) illustrates 
this view by appealing to women in the police force, who adopt 
masculine discourse to conform to standards of professionalism 
and credibility. Drawing upon McElhinny’s (1998) work, Mills 
points out that workplaces like the police force are gendered in 
ways advancing norms and practices attached to masculinity. 
Women police officers need to take on masculine discourse to ap-
pear credible and professional to other police officers and the wider 
community. Women working in such environments may fail to 
recognize the pressures of conforming to masculine discourse, in-
stead seeing their language use as simply part of what is needed to 
do the job (p. 195). But performing masculinity is unlikely to in-
crease women’s power in these environments. Martin (2003) shows 
that men who practice masculinity (or masculinities) according to 
masculine stereotypes that define men as dominant and more pow-
erful gain approval and status from men. Martin appeals to 
McGuire (2000) to argue that women who engage in gendering 
practices consistent with norms of masculinity often lose approval 
and status. Mills references Walsh’s (2001) studies to show that 
women who adopt masculine styles of discourse are generally 
viewed negatively within that domain. Ann Robinson, the presenter 
of the British television show “The Weakest Link,” often used 
masculine, aggressive discourse but she was widely criticized in 
the British media—unlike her counterpart Jeremy Paxman who 
similarly evidenced abrasive, forthright discourse (p. 194). As Mar-
tin puts it, “playing by the rules does not guarantee success because 
men may not perceive women as “succeeding” even when they 
“objectively” do” (p. 361).  So, women adopting masculine dis-
course within that context often lose approval and status. If having 
power and authority rely upon approval and status, then women 
adopting masculine discourse strategies will struggle to maintain 
power and authority in professional contexts. 
As an alternative to adopting masculine discourse, women 
might take up adversarial argumentation strategies. But this does 
not prove any better a method to increasing power and authority. 
Rooney (2003) points out that women who adopt masculine 
discourse are cast with negative descriptions, such as “overly 
strident,” “brash,” or “uppity.” We can envisage a long list of 
negative terms applied to women using masculine language 
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oriented around personal insults (“rude,” “cold,” “bitch,”) aimed at 
showing how those supposed personality traits, not the strength of 
her reasoning, are the source of a woman’s ability to show up 
another’s argument. These ascriptions undermine women’s charac-
ter in a way affecting authority in argumentation contexts. 
Character ascriptions are critical to authority. Tindale shows that 
having the sort of character that is trustworthy and excellent, what 
Tindale calls a character of high quality, is relevant to the weight of 
one’s argument. Were Socrates to advise us to do something it 
would count as a good reason to do it (1999, p. 74). Socrates thus 
presents an argument with authority. 
 Tindale explains that he is not offering a fallacious appeal to 
authority in making this claim. On his view, an appeal to authority 
involves some specific expertise or knowledge that someone is said 
to possess as reason to adhere to an argument’s thesis. In contrast, 
recognizing an arguer’s authority recognizes one’s character as a 
trustworthy reason to accept his position. Tindale explains that the 
arguer’s authority works as part of the background assumptions 
that are either shared or not in argumentation contexts. When the 
recognition of authority is present, it may be possible to proceed 
with one’s argument to secure agreement. Without that recognition, 
the acceptability of the argument is itself undermined (pp. 74-75). 
Tindale offers the example of a professor who assumes that stu-
dents will recognize her authority as a warrant for the relevancy of 
the information presented. She can proceed with her discussion so 
long as that assumption is shared with her audience, the students of 
the class. Audiences not recognizing a professor’s authority can 
derail the context, challenging the professor inappropriately and 
hence, show disrespect for the professor. That lack of respect at 
once reveals a lack of authority recognition and thus, the 
acceptability of the professor’s argument (p. 108). Now let’s 
consider a gendered analysis to see how much more complex 
possessing authority for women is within such contexts. 
Hanrahan and Antony (2005) argue that women encounter 
significant difficulties developing and maintaining authority within 
the context of professional philosophy. These difficulties are tied to 
philosophy’s view of women and reasoning. If wielding authority 
requires making decisions based on reasoned arguments, then 
women who assume positions of power are placed in a double bind: 
 
On the one hand, we have to prove to others that we are 
rational in order to establish that we are worthy of 
whatever authority we have been given. But, on the other 
hand, our willingness to prove that we are rational 
undermines that very authority we wish to preserve. 
(Hanrahan and Antony, p. 74.) 
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The authors point out that authoritative legitimacy cannot be 
captured on a purely procedural account. Offering reasoned 
judgements and having a willingness to defend those judgements 
are integral to possessing authority and evidence a commitment to 
procedural fairness. But a procedural account cannot fully capture 
authoritative legitimacy. The authors point out that authority can 
also be a matter of not having to defend one’s judgements, 
precisely because of who one is. Authority is the place where 
explanation stops. Position, experience, and training determine 
whether or not one can legitimately say, as a person with authority, 
“Because I said so” (p. 66). 
 Feminine politeness undermines women’s ability to possess 
authority. Expressing oneself using hedges, tag questions, or in a 
questioning intonation reveals a lack of assurance in one’s view: 
one is willing to concede to another’s point of view on the matter 
readily and, in the case of tag questions, hopefully. Women in 
philosophy adopting feminine politeness will be frustrated in their 
efforts to be taken as authorities by their colleagues and students. 
Speaking with authority in philosophy supposes masculine dis-
course because men dominate philosophy and they tend to adopt 
masculine discourse. Women’s arguments not adhering to 
philosophy’s model of masculine discourse are questioned—often, 
and without apology. And yet adopting masculine discourse 
strategies does not guarantee women’s authority. Dominant groups 
tend to accord authority to themselves, valuing characteristics of 
authority they have or are stereotypically supposed to have 
(Addelson 1983). Valuing the authority of the dominant group is 
typically accompanied by withholding authority from subordinates 
who lack, or stereotypically are supposed to lack, those external 
markers of authority determined by the dominant group. Since 
philosophy is dominated by men, those who are gendered women 
may still find they lack authoritative legitimacy because of who 
they are. So, women in philosophy face an authority double bind: it 
does not seem possible for women to attain authority unless they 
adopt masculine discourse; but then, women who do adopt 
masculine discourse do not seem to have authoritative legitimacy. 
The authority double bind women in philosophy face is 
evident in student encounters. Philosophy students are inculcated in 
the argument-as-war metaphor, which renders arguments as easy 
targets, weak, or otherwise worth shooting down if they are 
presented with any sort of feminine politeness. Students are quick 
to pick up on perceived weaknesses and so the hostile atmosphere 
for women in philosophy is often replicated in the classroom.16 
                                                 
16 Penaluna (2009) notes that some disciplines have incorporated a critical ap-
proach to the interpretation of patriarchal texts and have raised awareness of 
women’s works, and yet philosophy has done little to address the negative con-
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Students often question women’s status as authorities in the 
classroom, challenging women professors at inappropriate times 
and ways that ask them to justify their decisions before others. 
Doing so disrespects women as authorities who possess the right to 
make determinations as they see fit, given their training, position 
and experience. As we saw above, an unwillingness to engage in 
public inspection of one’s reasoning can exemplify authority: it is 
enough that Socrates is speaking that one should respect the 
authority of his claims. Not so for women in philosophy. Women’s 
unwillingness to defend their reasoning is often taken as a sign of 
incompetence or inadequacy on the one hand; or authoritarianism 
on the other. Either is a sign of illegitimate authority.17 If women in 
philosophy defend their professional authority then they are seen as 
less authoritative; if they do not defend it, then their authority 
seems illegitimate. We can imagine that women in other 
professional contexts dominated by masculine discourse face a 
similar challenge to possessing and maintaining authority in 
argumentation contexts. And we can expect that, like women in 
other professional contexts, women in philosophy who engage in 
masculine discourse or adversarial argumentation as part of what it 
means to do the job are unlikely to gain increased power or status 
from doing so. 
 
5. Politeness Selectivity  
The feminist claim of this paper is that gendered norms of 
politeness place women in oppressive double binds within 
argumentation contexts. Feminine politeness disempowers, de-
motes, and denigrates women, indicating cooperation through sub-
verting one’s own position for the sake of others’ interests. Hence, 
an ideal of cooperation in argumentation contexts seems neither 
reasonable nor rational for women. Women willing to transgress 
feminine norms of politeness might approach cooperative argu-
                                                                                                              
sequences of its male-dominated canon. Since the time of Aristotle philosophers 
have characterized women as irrational or unreasonable (Hanrahan and Antony, 
2005). Penaluna points out that women in philosophy identify more with the 
canon than other disciplines: a good philosophy student emulates great philoso-
phers of the canon; it would be odd for students of English to write like Shake-
speare or of History to act like Pericles. Since male philosophers are the model 
for students to emulate, and those philosophers denigrate women, this creates a 
chilly climate for women philosophers. For more on the hostile nature of 
philosophy for women, both as professional academics and students, some recent 
discussions include Garry (2009), Crasnow (2009), Dillon (2009) and Haslanger 
(2008).  
17 Authoritarianism is a form of illegitimate authority permitting no review and 
no redress, which the authors differentiate from legitimate authority (Hanrahan 
and Antony, p. 72). 
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mentation through masculine discourse or adopt adversarial ideals 
of argumentation. But these transgressive women are typically 
ascribed negative character ascriptions: these women (but not men) 
are seen as overly strident, rude, brash, cold, catty, or bitchy. 
Character is related to authority recognition. In recognizing author-
ity one recognizes another’s character as a reason to accept that 
person’s position. So it is reason enough that it is Socrates making 
a judgement that one should grant him authority. Yet, as we have 
seen, if it is a transgressive woman making a judgement it is reason 
to dismiss her authority. Women are thus caught in an authority 
double bind: women are typically denied authority in contexts 
dominated by masculine discourse; yet defending authority renders 
their authority less legitimate.  
I shall close with the following suggestion, leaving a full 
account for another project. I suggest that women wishing to 
navigate their possibilities for successful argumentation and 
persuasion within masculine discourse contexts might manoeuvre 
their way out of some of the double binds discussed above through 
politeness selectivity. Politeness selectivity relies on two different 
sorts of dialogical strategies, which I refer to elsewhere as 
communities of separation and communities of negotiation ( 
Burrows 2005).  
 Communities of separation are communities removed from 
dominant oppressive contexts through any sort of means, including 
physical or political separation. Dialogical communities of 
separation distinguish themselves from dominant, oppressive 
discourse contexts. I argued in my earlier work (Burrows 2005) 
that such dialogical communities allow persons to express and 
reflect upon the social meanings of their experiences and to 
develop a language to intelligibly express that experience. I 
consider collaborative communication integral to separatist 
communities, given that a central aim is for interlocutors to respect 
persons as the persons they are, as particular selves embedded 
within social and historical contexts. I additionally suggest now 
that developing the ability to construct dialogue apart from 
dominant stereotypes will enable agency to flourish within these 
communities through finding new ways of expressing and 
achieving power and status. Women can engage in dialogical 
communities separate from dominant masculine discourse to 
explore authority within argumentation contexts through different 
forms of cooperation or adversariality than those fitting typically 
gendered stereotypes. We have seen that stereotypes of femininity 
inform social understandings of polite discourse in ways devaluing 
women’s power and status. Embracing separatist communities of 
women’s dialogue in ways that redefine feminine politeness may 
provide an avenue for women who wish to transgress dominant 
norms and practices of politeness without wholeheartedly em-
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bracing typically masculine discourse strategies.18  
In communities of negotiation, oppressed persons negotiate 
power and status under complex contexts of domination. 
Successful negotiation overthrows oppressive practices and 
overcomes divisiveness through acknowledging commonalities. 
Within dialogical communities of negotiation, women can 
challenge dominant masculine discourse strategies aimed at 
establishing superiority-subordinate rankings. Sara Mills (2003) 
illustrates how women might transgress feminine politeness within 
masculine contexts through swearing. Like interruption, 
monologues, or silence, swearing evidences masculine discourse. 
Swearing establishes status and power for women within masculine 
contexts, which Mills illustrates by appealing to women in 
positions of political power. Madeline Albright, the American ex-
Secretary of State, stated that she nearly gave Colin Powell an 
aneurysm with her “bad language.” When she saw Cuban fighter 
pilots celebrate after shooting down an American plane, she 
famously said in an interview, “That’s not cajones [balls] that’s 
cowardice” (Mills 2003, p. 193). Mo Mowlam, the ex-Northern 
Ireland Minister, was similarly reputed to use much “bad language” 
in meetings. Since Margaret Thatcher, it is more acceptable for 
women in high profile political positions to adopt such masculine 
discourse strategies. Mills suggests that those who do mark 
themselves as more competent and powerful through showing that 
they are not restricted by stereotypes of femininity (pp. 193-194). 
So it seems that some women, those who already enjoy a certain 
power and status, can selectively use masculine discourse to 
maintain or advance that power and status. Yet as we saw above, 
women who predominantly use masculine discourse are subject to 
loss of power and status. Mills does not seem to recognize this 
worry, even though she acknowledges that women often face 
negative repercussions for using masculine discourse in that 
domain. While Mills says little about authority or argumentation, 
this paper shows that gendered norms of politeness are connected 
to an authority double bind for women in argumentation contexts. 
I suggest a model of politeness selectivity as a means for 
women to navigate double binds in gendered argumentation 
contexts. Politeness selectivity determines how much politeness is 
worth extending to others based on the kind of dialogical 
community one is in. In communities of separation, women can 
reject typical feminine politeness strategies through assertive 
dialogue that expresses the value of their own interests while 
aiming to uphold respect and regard between persons. Revising or 
                                                 
18 Transgressing gender stereotypes becomes a matter of negotiation when wo-
men who work to redefine feminine politeness bring those dialogical practices to 
the wider community.  
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rejecting stereotypes of feminine politeness in these communities 
provides an opportunity for women to experience benefits of 
mutual cooperation, trust, and otherwise harmonious social 
interaction. In communities of negotiation, mutual regard, trust, 
and respect is implicitly threatened by masculine discourse aimed 
at establishing dominant-subordinate rankings. I suggest that those 
wishing to avoid subordinating politeness norms might selectively 
choose when to negotiate within masculine discourse contexts and 
when to engage in communities of separation instead. Gaining 
confidence in one’s power and status within communities of 
separation is good preparation for entering communities of 
negotiation. Women transgressing gendered discourse can expect 
attempts to undermine character, power, or status. And so, 
anticipating not counterexamples but character degradation is 
important preparation for transgressive women who, like 
stereotypically feminine women, face challenges to authority.  
Alison Jaggar recently reflected on how she first gained insight 
from feminist theory concerning her discomfort with being 
engaged in a predominantly male discipline of philosophy: “it was 
indeed liberating to consider that something was wrong with the 
prevailing norms of gender rather than something was wrong with 
me” (Jaggar 2003, p. 65). I hope to have shown how women might 
gain a similarly liberating insight into the oppressive gender norms 
underwriting argumentation contexts. Appreciating how authority 
is affected by politeness strategies employed in gendered 
argumentation contexts is importantly informative for women 
wishing to avoid or navigate masculine discourse, and for those 
women and men who are willing to instigate social and political 
change toward more inclusive ideals of argumentation.  
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